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"Kant," wrote Nietzsche in The Gay Science, "wanted to prove in a way 
that would dumbfound the common man that the common man was 
right; this was the secret joke of his sou1."1 Nicholas Cook's Music, Imagina-
tion, and Culture has little use for Kant, but what Nietzsche called Kant's 
joke is the centerpiece of this intelligent, meticulously argued, and pro-
foundly retrogressive book. 
Cook's topic is the relationship between musical experience-specifi-
cally the experience of Western art music since the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury-and musicological discourse. His starting point is the fact that many 
people who know little or nothing about this music nonetheless take in-
tense pleasure in it. He cites empirical studies suggesting that what might 
be called the listener's working ignorance of the music is no hindrance to 
such pleasure, and that working knowledge is no help. For many listeners, 
formal elements as simple as literal repetition and tonal closure go unrec-
ognized, leaving dim hope for the recognition of large-scale tonal rela-
tions and complex structures like sonata form. Even musically knowledge-
able listeners, one study suggests, tend to listen knowledgeably only when 
they have some explicit reason to do so. 
All this untutored musical pleasure, whether founded on absent or 
absentee knowledge; spells trouble. As Cook observes, the practice of lis-
tening for pleasure is culture-specific, taking its impetus from the develop-
ment of aesthetics in eighteenth-century Europe. Consistent with this ori-
gin, it operates on the basis of two cardinal assumptions: (1) that "the 
significance of music lies in what we perceive as we listen to it," and (2) 
that "to perceive something aesthetically is to perceive it as an integrated 
whole" (p. 5). But if a listener's aesthetic pleasure in music can arise 
without reference to the formal design of the music, then these two as-
sumptions clash. Either the significance of music must lie in something 
not perceived, in which case it is not aesthetic, or the aesthetic value of 
the music has nothing to do with the perception of integrated wholes, in 
which case it makes no sense to base aesthetic judgments on the grounds 
of musical design. In the second case, the practical irrelevance of design 
may also constitute an epistemological irrelevance. For if design (form, 
structure) is oflittle or no aesthetic consequence, then it is hard to see in 




sic, or, for that matter, in what sense music can be understood at all. 
There are several obvious solutions to this dilemma. One, sanctioned 
by figures like Hanslick, Schenker, and Adorno, is to regard untutored 
musical pleasure as something passive and sentimental, a kind of Lumpen 
pleasure that, if it cannot be eradicated, can at least be looked down Oli. 
Cook is rightly dismissive of this position, and has some trenchant things 
to say about its watered-down incarnation as "music appreciation." Surely 
the notion that listeners must distrust their responses to music unless 
some musicological Vergil appears to guide them through the underworld 
of formal design is both foolishly elitist and blandly question-begging. 
A second solution is to contest Cook's claim that the formal design of 
music has little or no bearing on its aesthetic effect. Cook is certainly 
vulnerable to such contestation. His argument consistently turns on the 
fact that the elements of formal design go unrecognized by listeners. But I 
do not necessarily fail to perceive something just because I fail to recog-
nize it, or, more exactly, just because I cannot give an explicit retrospec-
tive account of my perception of it. A host of human transactions, from 
seductions to political campaigns (assuming there's a difference) depend 
on the effectiveness of unrecognized or marginally recognized percep-
tions. Most movie-goers know nothing at all about film editing, yet it 
would be strange indeed to suggest that their responses have not been 
profoundly shaped and even manipulated by the way a movie has been 
edited. Sonata form may be no different; musical for musicians, it may 
work for most people in silence. And to the likelihood that formal design 
in the arts can work as well, or better, in hiding as in the open, we must 
add the possibility that some designs work unconsciously, in the psycho-
analytic sense of being fended off, not simply overlooked, by the listener. 
Yet Cook may still have a point. To show that formal patterns can shape 
aesthetic response is not to show that, in every case, they do, or that every 
formal pattern in a given work, or during a given performance, is aestheti-
cally active. There is assuredly some degree of disparity between formal 
design and aesthetic pleasure, and we do need to confront the issues that 
this raises . 
. Cook confronts them by forthrightly endorsing the radical separation 
of formal design (or the knowledge of it) and aesthetic pleasure. The 
formal side of what he calls "the musical fabric," the side on which musiCo-
logical knowledge is embroidered, he assigns to the culture of profes-
sional musicians engaged in the production, by which he primarily means 
the performance, of music. "Productional" knowledge enables profession-
als to imagine, and therefore to make decisions. about or, in Roland 
Barthes's term, to "operate," the music they produce.2 Although it may 
serve to enhance the listening pleasure of "connoisseurs," its more impor-
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tant function is to enhance the effectiveness of performance. "A performer," 
writes Cook, 
who has grasped an extended piece in Schenkerian terms may be 
able to bring to his performance a higher degree of large-scale rhyth-
mic or dynamic shaping just because he has a reflective awareness of 
the music's structure that exceeds anything that is ordinarily experi-
enced by the listener (p. 4). 
As to the listener "himself" (Cook's sexist usage is consistent), he need 
be concerned only with the "receptional" side of the musical fabric; the 
arcana of production can take care of themselves. All the listener has to 
do is-just listen. 
Cook's reception-production duality is correlated with two modes of 
listening that he calls the "musical" and the "musicological." These modes 
are not created equal. Musical listening is direct, immediate, unreflective, 
and pleasure-oriented; musicological listening is distanced, mediated, re-
flective, and knowledge-oriented. Musical listening is based on involve-
ment with the music. Even if it at times incorporates an awareness of 
formal patterns or "extramusical" connections, such awareness cannot be 
"foundational" to it (pp. 158, 167). Musicological listening is tendentious. 
Its purpose is "the establishment of facts and the formulation of theories," 
and it usually finds exactly what it is looking for. To be sure, Cook reas-
sures us that there is nothing wrong with musicological listening, and 'he 
obviously indulges in it himself; like his earlier book A Guide to Musical 
Analysis (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1987), this one is full of interesting 
formal observations that purely "musical" listeners will find hard to follow. 
But Cook clearly thinks that musicological listening does more harm than 
good unless it is firmly subordinated to musical listening on the one hand 
and to the culture of production on the other. 
Cook's impatience with a kind of hard-core musical formalism will strike 
a sympathetic chord in many readers; certainly it strikes one in me. But if 
the hegemonic regime of musical formalism is a problem, so is Cook's 
solution to it. In fact, it is exactly the same problem. Irrationalism and 
hyperrationalism are merely two sides of the same coin; morphologically, 
a populist insistence on the spontaneous pleasures of just listening is no -
different from an elitist insistence on musical erudition as the prerequisite 
of true -listening. The same binary hierarchy of emotion and thought, 
intuition and reason, spontaneity and mediation, underwrites each posi-
tion; each position is made rigid and hyperbolical by the need to police 
the musical domain against its counterpart. The only difference concerns 
which end of the seesaw is up. 
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What Cook fails, crucially, to recognize is that the terms by which he 
opposes the regime of formalist aesthetics are themselves the historical 
product of formalist aesthetics. Only with the development of the norma-
tive concept of aesthetic pleasure-a higher pleasure structured by the 
formal design of an artwork-does the concept of a deviant, lower, un-
structured pleasure become thinkable. Reversing the hierarchy, so that 
the unstructured pleasure is idealized as a primary, vital force and the 
structured pleasure demoted to a pedantic illusion, only perpetuates the 
regime that it means to oppose. 
One sign of that perpetuation is the hectoring tone that surfaces in 
some of Cook's most forceful statements of his position: 
What the listener is basically concerned with is not the meaning of 
the [musical] work but its effect; and this is something that requires 
no mediation and indeed brooks none (p. 173). 
To think that one can understand music in some abstract, symbolical 
sense that can be separated from ... aesthetic participation is simply 
to misunderstand the whole nature of the enterprise. . .. [T] here is 
only reading [music], memorizing it, performing it, composing it, 
and listening to it-in short, loving it. . . . [Thus testified] Igor 
Stravinsky ... when he remarked, "I haven't understood a bar of 
music in my life; but I have felt it." Further comment seems superflu-
ous (p. 18~). 
Rather than mediation, what well-placed people usually do not "brook" 
is opposition, and the unspoken term resonates harshly 'in Cook's first 
statement. (His occasional praise of F.R. Leavis, the vitalist literary critic 
who in 1948 announced that there had been five, and only five, great 
novelists in English, adds to the resonance.) As for the second statement, 
Stravinsky'S calculatedly anogant remark notwithstanding, further com-
ment on the "musical-musicological" duality is anything but superfluous. 
As Cook avows, this duality articulates a more basic hierarchical opposi-
tion between primary, unreflective experience and secondary, discursive 
reflection. The reflection both derives from the experience and inevitably 
falsifies it. In its aesthetic applications, including Cook's, this familiar post-
Cartesian opposition is typically invoked to invest art with the power to 
overcome the alienating effects of reflection. Works of art, like Keats's 
Grecian urn, are expected to tease us out of thought. That they largely fail 
to do so, as Keats made a point of showing about the urn, has not done 
much to alter the expectation, nor has the inner logic we encountered 
with Cook's musical-musicological duality: the logic by which the "immedi-
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ate" term appears only as a retrospective posit of the "mediated" term. 
One thing, however, that has dented the expectation of a redemptory 
aesthetic immediacy is some twenty years of anti-foundationalist thinking 
by literary theorists, cultural theorists, and philosophers. Deconstruction, 
neopragmatism, Foucauldian theories of discourse, some versions of femi-
nism, psychoanalysis, and ideology critique-all have radically questioned, 
not to say scourged, the binary opposition of immediacy and reflection. 
On the one hand, the immediacy of experience is understood from these 
new perspectives to be discursive and reflective through and through; 
immediacy, as Jacques Derrida once put it, is derived.3 On the other hand, 
this derivative character of experience presents no hindrance to pleasure, 
intensity, or even "spontaneity." Accordingly, the whole question of "expe-
rience" needs to be rethought. Or, more exactly, the weight of recent 
theorizing has done what nineteenth-century expressions of self-doubt like 
Keats's could not do, and made this re-thinking in some sense imperative. 
To all of this, Cook is oblivious. And this deeply undermines his posi-
tion, not because he fails to be obligingly postmodemist but because he 
. fails to see that any credible defense of the duality on which he depends 
so much must take account of postmodemist critiques. The redemptory 
status of art may yet be redeemed (shades of Parsifal!) but only by some-
one who understands why it is in tatters. 
In the meantime, one way out of the impasse between untutored musi-
cal pleasure and unanchored accounts of musical form might be to regard 
music in other than aesthetic terms. I am thinking particularly of recent 
efforts to understand music as one of the energies or agencies of culture, 
as both a means by which people are acculturated and a means by which 
culture is (trans)formed.4 For Cook, however, this possibility does not 
arise. He considers "reflective" forms of musical hermeneutics to be just 
another variety of the "musicological" and dismisses attempts to under-
stand music in relation to "social or personal values" or "expressive or 
representational content" as "not very important" (p. 171). The rare works 
such as Mozart's The Marriage of Figaro and Beethoven's Ninth Symphony 
that "demand" an "interpretative stance" from the listener are relegated to 
a hybrid category that makes them "literary as well as musical" (p. 168). 
More broadly, no interpretative stance can be granted a "foundational" 
role in my experience as a listener (p. 166); a piece like the third mov<e-
ment of Bartok's Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta will "make sense" 
whether, or not, I hear it as "night sounds" (p. 171). 
This position is so dyed in the aesthetic wool that contesting it seenlS 
like a fool's errand. You either have to take it or leave it. Leaving it, 
however, might be easier for undecided readers if its full implications are 
spelled out, and luckily Cook goes far enough at one point to make that 
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possible. Contrasting literary with musical works, he argues that the former 
put substantial constraints on freedom of thought in the reader while the 
latter largely enfranchise that freedom in the listener. (The distinction is 
dubious on several grounds, but let that go.) "I can think," he continues; 
of Till Eulenspiegel's merry pranks or listen to Strauss's symphonic 
poem as absolute music; I can track the evolution of the work's form 
or see shapes moving in space; I can listen to the E flat clarinet or 
listen to nothing in particular (p. 170). 
For that matter, one might add, I can fall asleep or enjoy a train of 
sadomasochistic fantasies. But so what? 
My answer is that I could do all of these things indifferently if my 
relationship to Strauss's music were purely private and appropriative. But I 
will simply not want to do most of them if I think of myself as living in 
history, as having a relationship to a past which is in some measure my 
own prehistory, and as being dialogically involved with persons and posi-
tions, past and present, that differ from me and mine. If Strauss's music 
means nothing to me but what I narcissistically want it to mean, then it 
means little more than nothing. Know-nothingism is know-nothingism, 
even if it is refined enough to notice the E flat clarinet. To be sure, I want 
to listen to music for pleasure, but I do not demand that my pleasure be 
ignorant or idealized, or that it be modeled exclusively on perception as 
opposed to, say, cultural, social, sexual, or discursive interaction. 
Music, Imagination, and Culture is, as I said at the head of this review, an 
intelligent and meticulously argued book. Ironically, given its argument, it 
is at its best in discussing esoteric matters like fingering and- notation; 
Kant's joke casts a long shadow. But taken as a whole, the book is,or 
should be, a source of consternation. It sets itself squarely against the 
malaise that increasingly bedevils the culture of Western art music, but is 
itself a symptom of that malaise. To paraphrase Karl Kraus's famous wise-
crack about psychoanalysis, this book is the sickness of which it believes 
itself to be the cure. 
-Lawrence Kramer 
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